

CLANDESTINE SERVICES REVIEW QUESTIONS [REDACTED]

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6 December 1960

1. Please give your views on the bottleneck in CIA's promotion program and what the future is for the career employee?
2. In view that the morale of employees will affect operations, at least by degree in efficiency, what is being done to ensure a fair promotion program and a systematic procedure for the placement and directed reassignment of personnel?
3. Do staff officers in the "hump" ages actually still have any realistic advancement prospects?
4. What is the Agency doing to solve the promotion problem? We all know good men who have done good jobs for years and yet have no apparent prospect of promotion. The problem must be solved or the Agency will lose talent and experience it needs. Able young men also will be increasingly unwilling to join an agency that offers little chance of advancement.
5. Does the Agency have an effective selection-out system? If so, why is there still deadwood around in the GS 14-18 bracket?
6. A significant number of GS-11 and GS-12 personnel are capable of handling GS-15 and GS-16 positions if given the chance. Yet only a few will ever get much further than they are now, unable to realize their ambitions and capabilities. What hope can you offer to the GS-11 or GS-12 who faces such a bleak future?
7. In the long-range view on assignments and promotions over the next 10 to 20 years within the DD/P, will it be possible for career case officers presently in the GS-11 - GS-13 category to continue to work and grow as case officers without being expected to compete for and assume the management and supervisory positions already occupied by relatively young, but more senior, personnel? Put another way, will the DD/P some day have a cadre of senior case officers at the GS-14 to 15 level who will be involved in on-the-line DD/P operations instead of supervisory activities?
8. Officers overseas normally work 50-60 hours a week without extra compensation. Many refuse vacations because there is no slack in duties to permit their absence. Yet the DD/P is going through an attrition of personnel stage; at the same time there is an ever increasing workload. This situation cannot continue indefinitely without severe damage to career personnel. Would you comment please?

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9. At least in some divisions, staff personnel have been in place for many years even though non-staff personnel have changed. Although division staffs do not have the power they once had, is there not an unhealthy accumulation of fat resulting from this situation?
10. On 29 November, Mr. Amory spoke favorably of exchange and rotational personnel assignments between the DD/I and the Clandestine Services. There are similar arrangements between the Clandestine Services and OTR. What is the Clandestine Services position in these exchanges and rotational assignments and how - briefly - do they complicate or affect CS personnel administration?
11. Liaison operations are among the most difficult and complicated that exist. Would you comment on the DD/P approach to liaison and the possibility or advisability of a liaison career concentration within the DD/P for officers with proved liaison ability?
12. How much time does the Chief of Operations spend greeting and meeting with foreign intelligence and security officials?
13. Has the Agency created a reserve component available for call-up in the event of hostilities?
14. What effect will the Executive Order recalling dependents from overseas posts have on Agency dependents and overseas deployment?
15. How does this order affect future travel of dependents of Agency personnel now in process for overseas assignments?
16. Would you care to comment on the general professional competence of CIA personnel, particularly DD/P personnel overseas, in the light of criticism by other U.S. Government agencies, particularly officials in the Department of State?
17. The DD/P has emphasized repeatedly the need to develop and build more non-official cover. The divisions, on the other hand, feel compelled to use time and money to resolve problems of immediacy and to produce now. How are we to reconcile long-term plans with what division chiefs construe to be short-term needs?
18. Is it the intention of the Clandestine Services eventually to get away from official cover completely in its overseas operations?
19. Would you care to comment on the extent to which plans for placing case officers under non-official cover throughout the world have been carried out?
20. While the need for developing non-official cover is much stressed in certain areas where official cover is hard to obtain, I have an impression that only lip service is paid to this concept in other areas perhaps because of the greater nuisance to a station of supporting persons under non-official cover. Will you comment?

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21. [REDACTED]
22. Do you expect the new building will increase overall efficiency and security?
23. In your opinion, has the bureaucratic machinery within the Agency improved sufficiently to allow the Chief of Operations to maintain the desired amount of control and direction of DD/P assets toward the shifting, high-priority targets of today? If so, are the present arrangements likely to remain unchanged, or are we likely to see more reorganization?
24. What organizational and operational program changes if any, should be effected or worked toward in the Agency?
25. Please comment on the effectiveness and adequacy of the OA process.
26. How effective are the requirements formulation, allocation, and acceptance procedures within the intelligence community?
27. In view of CIA's responsibility in the writing of the NIS Section 56 and other special studies relating to CI, what is being done to ensure that we are receiving the full support of U.S. intelligence agencies in passing the required information needed for this professional undertaking as directed by the NSCID's?
28. Is the extent and nature of Agency dissemination to other agencies of the product, particularly the positive intelligence product, of our CI operations satisfactory?
29. What effects will the change of national administration have on the internal organization and general operational programs of the Agency?
30. Please comment on the relative merits of SR's being established as an operating division or as a staff.
31. What is the DD/P African policy?
32. Do you foresee any PM operations in Africa?
33. Several speakers have emphasized the importance and the lack of scientific and technical intelligence on the Sino-Soviet bloc. In this context would you please comment on:
- The role of agent operations to meet such requirements.
 - Ways in which agent operations might be re-oriented or adapted.
 - What the Clandestine Services should require in operational training or familiarization for personnel.

34. Without identifying them, and without other elaborative comment, does the DD/P have under way any other really high yield FI collection operations of a quality similar [redacted] 25X1D0b
35. There is a Pentagon rumor that the service intelligence agencies are going to consolidate their foreign intelligence branches. Do you think that they might ultimately merge their clandestine foreign operations?
36. What can the Agency do to improve working relationships with the military services?
37. Is not the basing of de-emphasis of operational activity on the concept of a static military and political relationship between East and West in Europe relying heavily on the opposition's following the same operational plan?
38. Please discuss the areas of performance in DD/P in which you think the Agency is weakest and should be stronger. What can we do towards strengthening this lack? What top-level direction is building up these weak spots?
39. Has the DD/P been penetrated at any time by the opposition insofar as you are aware?
40. What can be done when a chief of station repeatedly violates security regulations?